REGULATION OF SECURITIES BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION by RODELL, FRED
REGULATION OF SECURITIES BY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION
FRED RODELLt
THE Federal Securities Act was passed to protect individuals from losing
their money by investing it in unsoundly or unscrupulously financed
business enterprises.' If the bald statement amounts to a truism, that
fact is not made apparent by the oral and written discussion which the
Act has provoked.2 Informed by that discussiofi alone, the layman
might as readily suppose that the Act was intended to harass innocent
dealers in securities and drive honest investment bankers out of business.
For discussion of the Act has crowded around the provisions for civil lia-
bility,3 in the nude. Unclothed by judicial interpretation, unhampered
by application to a definite set of facts, these provisions have appeared
as bogey-man .a Financial leaders and the lawyers who work for them,
anxious to see those provisions restricted, have blown them up to im-
possible proportions, and have read into them in the abstract such
meanings as they themselves would be the first to discredit in the par-
ticular.4
tAssistat Professor of Law, Yale University.
More than the customary acknowledgment is due to John Gates, of tlhe third year class
in the Yale School of Law, without whose assistance this article would not have been
written.
1. The simplicity of this statement does not signify unawareness of the fact that what
the Act literally dqes is to afford publicity to the pertinent facts concerning a security
issue, and thus presumably enable the investor to judge its worth. It is true that the
average investor may make use of this opportunity only indirectly, in accepting the finan-
cial advice of his banker or broker who will make the actual judgment on the facts divulged.
It is also true that the Act imposes remedial and punitive penalties on those responsible
for false or misleading publicity. Nevertheless, the essential purpose of the Act, whether
accomplished actively or passively, directly or indirectly, is to protect investors.
2. Cf. The Wall St. Journal, Nov. 6, 1933, at 1; id. Oct. 31, 1933, at 6; (1933) 137
Comm. AND FIE. Cm:ox. 254; id. at 3241; (1933) 21 NATIoN's BussNEss 39; Wllerry, The
New Federal Securities Act (1933) 12 PuB. UTi. FORT. 123; Dean, The Federal Securities
Act (1933) 8 (2) FORTUNE 50; Business Week, July 8, 1933, at 14; U. S. News, Aug. 26-
at 27; N. Y. Herald Tribune, Sept. 11, 1933, at 6.
3. P. L. No. 22, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) §§ 11, 12. For analysis, see THORPE AD
3. P. L. No. 22, 73d Cong., 1st Sess (1933) §§ 11, 12. For analysis, see THORPE AND
ELLis, MAwuAL or Tn FEDmAL SECUpRTIs ACT (1933) 92-113.
3a. Cf. The Securities Act: An Interim Report (1933) 8 (6) FORTUNE 34, 137, com-
menting upon ". . . the truly fanciful interpretations which a few highly erudite lawyers
have built up, like'so many scarecrows, from the somewhat ambiguous phrases of the
law."
4. See F. M. Gordon, president of the Investment Banker's Association, in Wall St.
Journal, Oct. 31, 1933, at 1: "All over the United States corporations are ready to under-
take the necessary financing, but no corporation director in his senses is going to risk
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Whatever the merit of this discussion, however genuine these fears
may be, attention has been effectively steered away from the basic pur-
pose of the Acts That purpose is to prevent before curing; to protect
before punishing.6 And no matter how great the deterrent effect of the
fear of civil liability, it is significant that beforehand protection of in-
vestors is not left to that fear alone. The Act provides a definite method
of affirmative protection. Only when that protection fails will civil
liability be invoked. Only to the extent that it fails can fear of lia-
bility act as a deterrent. That protection is embodied in the power of
the Federal Trade Commission to issue and enforce stop orders against
the sale of improperly registered securities.7
existing resources by putting his name on financing under a law that makes him personally
liable for the next ten years and adopts the un-American principle that he is to be judged
guilty unless he can be proven innocent." See also A. V. Godsave, vice-president and trust
officer, Pacific National Bank of Seattle, (1933) 137 Coin . AND Fin. CHRoN. 3241; Arthur
Dean of Sullivan and Cromwell in N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1933, IX-3, and in (1933) 8
(2) FoRTUNEx 102-106; Philadelphia Public Ledger, Oct. 17, 1933, at 19.
5. Commissioner Landis in an address before the N. Y. State Society of Certified Public
Accountants, Oct. 30, 1933, said: "The Commission's powers of regulation have been
rarely emphasized in any discussion of the Act and to my mind they are of great conse-
quence. . . . I make these remarks on the Commission's powers of regulation and inter-
pretation not for the sake of emphasizing the powers as such but to illustrate the flexibilities
inherent in the Act and its capacities for adaptation to the complexities of the situations
it covers. Indeed, if half the energy that has been expended in fulminating against the
Act and propagandizing for amendments were enlisted in the effort to advise the Com-
mission in the wise exercise of its powers, the government and issuers, bankers, lawyers,
and accountants would be far nearer to a solution of their problems." (1933) 137 Com .
AND FnT. CHRON. 3243.
6. President Roosevelt in his message to Congress said: "The purpose of the legislation
I suggest is to protect the public with the least possible interference to honest business."
See Hearings on H. R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) at 1. The Act itself is entitled: "To
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other
purposes."
7. § 8:
"(b) If it appears to the Commission that a registration statement is on its face incom-
plete or inaccurate in any material respect, the Commission may, after notice . . . and
opportunity for hearing . . ., issue an order prior to the effective date of registration re-
fusing to permit such statement to become effective until it has been amended in ac-
cordance with such order. When such statement has been amended in accordance with
such order the Commission shall so declare and the registration shall become effective at
the time provided in subsection (a) or upon the date of such declaration, whichever date
is the later.
"(c) An amendment filed after the effective date of the registration statement, if such
amendment, upon its face, appears to the Commission not to be incomplete or inaccurate
in any material respect, shall become effective on such date as the Commission may
determine, having due regard to the public interest and the protection of investors.
"(d) If it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement in-
cludes any untrue statement of a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, the Commission may, after notice . . .
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The stop order is the first line of defense against bad security issues.
It can and should become the main line of defense. Direct recourse to
the courts for injunction' or mandamus,9 such as is granted the Com-
mission, should be needed only rarely,-to put teeth into a disobeyed
stop order or to spike a flagrant violation of the Act.
Moreover, the importance of the Commission's issuing or, conversely,
its failure to issue a stop order can not be overestimated in its effect on
subsequent civil or criminal suits arising from the sale of registered
securities. Despite insistence by the Commission, 0 by Congress," and
by President Roosevelt 12 that registration under government supervi-
sion does not amount to a guarantee of the security, such registration
can not help but amount to a guarantee of immunity to those connected
with the issue who have neither consciously nor carelessly allowed ma-
terial facts to be misstated nor consciously allowed material facts to be
omitted. Whether or not approval of the scope of a registration by one
branch of the government, the Commission, might estop another branch
of the government, the courts, from later recording disapproval in the
form of a liability judgment, as a member of the Commission has sug-
gested, 3 it is at least certain that Commission acquiescence in a regis-
tration statement will weigh almost conclusively in favor of a defendant
charged with neglect to include in the statement facts about which he
had no special knowledge. In short, where the "materiality" of an
and after opportunity for hearing . .. , issue a stop order suspending the effectiveness of
the registration statement. When such statement has been amended in accordance with
such stop order the Commission shall so declare and thereupon the stop order shall cease
to be effective."
Subsection (e) empowers the Commission to make an examination in order to determine
whether a stop order shall issue under subsection (d).
8. § 20 (b).
9. § 20 (c).
10. Federal Trade Commission, Rules and Regulation under the Securities Act (1933)
art. 16, requires the following statement in every prospectus: "Neither the fact that such
registration statement has been filed with the Commission, nor the issuance of the prospec-
tus under the rules or regulations prescribed, shall be deemed a finding by the Commission
that this prospectus is true and accurate on its face, or omits to state a material fact or
to mean that the Commission has in any way passed upon the merits of, or given approval
to, such prospectus or the security mentioned therein."
11. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated in its report,
H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. Ist Sess. (1933) at 3: "In brief, the aims set forth by the Presi-
dent are: ... (2) A requirement that whatever action taken by the Federal Government for
such disclosure should be limited to that purpose and should be so devised as not to be
capable of being construed as an approval or guarantee of a security issue. . . . The
achievement of these ends is the principal purpose of this bill."
12. President Roosevelt in his message to Congress, supra note 6, said: "Of course, the
Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which might be construed as
approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their
value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit."
13. Landis, supra note 5.
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omission is concerned-and it is about this point that much of the
persecution cry has been raised,' 4 -no court is likely to expect an other-
wise blameless individual to be a better guesser than the Commission
itself.
Thus, in the absence of carelessness about ascertainable facts or a
downright intention to deceive on the part of those responsible for a
security issue, such protection as the Act affords investors hinges on
the ability and alertness of the Commission in supervising registration
of securities." It is for the Commission also to catch misstatements
and frauds whenever possible. But in the short space of time"G allotted
the Commission for investigation, concealed inaccuracies and clever de-
ceit will often slip through undetected. It is in such instances and
such instances only, where affirmative protection fails, that the curative
rights of investors and the punitive power of the government will come
into play. In day-to-day practice, and with respect to the overwhelming
majority of securities issued, the effectiveness of the Act will depend
directly on the able use of the stop order by the Commission.
14. See articles cited note 2, supra. In the Wall St. Journal, Oct. 31, 1933, at 1-2,
F. M. Gordon, president of the Investment Bankers Association, asserts that inclusion of
absolutely all facts with respect to any issue in a prospectus is impossible and that an
apparently trivial point omitted therefrom may in the light of later events turn out to be
of material importance and subject each banker and corporation to civil and criminal
liability. Landis, supra note 5, at 3242, in discussing such objections, indicates that such
fear seems unfounded inasmuch as the materiality is undoubtedly to be determined in view
of the circumstances at the time of registration.
15. Such alertness has to date been clearly demonstrated. Some $319,500,000 worth of
securities had been filed for registration with the Commission up to Nov. 8, 1933. By Oct.
28, 1933, eleven stop orders had been issued in the following cases: (1) Speculative In-
vestment Trust for failing to file a copy of proposed prospectus, not having proper certifi-
cation of its balance sheet, and for incorrect statements as to shares outstanding; (2)
American Gold Mines Consolidation, Inc., for omissions in balance sheet, improper certifi-
cation, and confusion as to shares already subscribed exceeding the amount registered for
issuance; (3) Industrial Institute, Inc., for general deficiencies in its statement; (4) Trans-
continental Precious Metals Corp. for failure to make prospectus show essential features
set forth in registration data; (5) Southern Crude Oil Co. for omission to file balance
sheet, profit and loss statement, and prospectus; (6) Liberty Brewing Co. for failure to
include in prospectus some essential features of registration statement; (7) Byron Gold
Mining Co. for omission of certification, incomplete prospectus, and incomplete statement of
shares authorized; (8) Southwestern Trading Co. for failure to state underwriter's com-
mission, to name executive officers, and to make prospectus "tie up" with registration
statement; (9) Golden West Mining Co. for discrepancy in assets and liabilities, incom-
plete profit and loss statement, and lack of certification; (10) Shamrock Gold Mining Co.
for incomplete report as to interests of officers, directors, and underwriters in property
acquired and failure to name donor of treasury stock; (11) Van Cortlandt Recreation
Corp. for incomplete report of interest of President in property acquired, for confusion
of balance sheet items, and failure to report purposes of security offered. (1933) 137 Comm .
AND FIr. CHaoN. 1341, 1519, 1706, 2391, 3084, 3245.
16. The Act provides for a twenty-day period after filing before the registration state-
ment becomes effective. § 8 (a).
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Over the head of the Commission, however, hangs a perpetual sword
of Damocles in the power of the courts to review.'1 If the enforcement
of the Act rests with the Commission, the efficacy of that enforcement
rests just as surely with the courts, in the tolerance with which they
come to regard the Commission's regulations and orders.
The courts which first review the Commission's orders will not be
working wholly without benefit of precedent. Government control of
security issues is not new. Moreover most of the state Blue Sky laws
are set up and administered along the same line as the Federal Securities
Act.18  Under most of them, although the field of regulation is more
limited, 9 there is the same preliminary control of specific security issues,
the same privilege of investigation, the same power to prohibit the sale
of questioned issues.2" Some of these state statutes allow the commis-
sions entrusted with their enforcement even broader discretionary powers
than are granted under the federal Act.2 ' Stop orders may be issued
17. § 9 (a).
18. Forty-seven states have Blue Sky laws. Three of these statutes are punitive in
nature, while the remainder are preventive. Most of the latter have provisions to con-
trol the sale of specific issues of securities by either qualification or notification, or both.
Qualification provides for approval and sale only after a preliminary investigation similar
to that required by the Federal Securities Act. Administration by qualification has proved
to be limited for two reasons: (1) the delays of preliminary approval are often so onerous
that bankers avoid selling in such states; (2) in a number of states requiring qualification,
modification of the terms of an issue permit it to be registered by notification instead and
this makes the issue effective on filing, with a power of stop order remaining in the com-
mission to be exercised when deemed advisable. See Perrin, The Blue Sky Laws (1916)
48 CHICAGo L. NEWS 327, 332; Brach, The Blue Sky Law (1919) 3 MARQULTTE L. REv.
142; Wham, Rights under Blue Sky Laws (1925) 15 A.BAJ. 310; Meeker, Preventive v.
Punitive Security Laws (1926) 26 COL. L. Rlv. 318; Thormodsgard, Middle West Blue Sky
Legislation (1927) 1 DAx. L. REV. 138; Ashby, Operation of the Blue Sky Laws (1927) 1
TEMPLE L. Q. 103; Dalton, Development and Future Trends in State Security Regulation
(1933) 12 HARv. Bus. REv. 23; Edwards, Control of the Security Investment System (1933)
12 id. 87; REED AND WAsimuaRN, BLUE SKY LAWs (1921).
19. Cf. MONTGOMERY, FiNANCIAL HANDBOOK (1933) 1173. In general the statutory
exemptions include: (1) securities of state, federal, or municipal governments; (2) enter-
prises already subject to regulation; (3) issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange;
(4) issues rated highly by financial manuals; (5) issues meeting certain tests of earning
power; (6) most real estate mortgage bonds and notes; (7) short term issues of less than a
year.
20. See 2 Commerce Clearing House, Stocks and Bonds Law Service, for state statutes;
UN ORm SALE or SEcuRiTiEs AcT § 8; MoNTGO yY, op. cit. supra note 19, at 1172.
21. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 3814, § 4 ("If he finds that the proposed plan
of business of the applicant is not unfair, unjust, or inequitable, that it intends to fairly
and honestly transact its business . . ."); 2 Mcir. CoMS'. LAws (1929) § 9780 (permission
shall not be granted where it appears to the commission ". . . that the proposed disposal
of securities is on unfair terms") ; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 158, § 189.07 ("If the proposed plan
of business of the issuer is not unlawful, dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise contrary to
public policy; the plan of financing is not unfair, inequitable, dishonest, or fraudulent . . .
otherwise it shall issue its ... order denying the application.").
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for any reason which the controlling board deems consonant with the
public interest.22
Yet even where the powers granted are so broad as perhaps to justify
the judicial fear of bureaucratic government, the courts have not tried
to restrict the commissions in their control of intrastate security trans-
actions under the Blue Sky laws.2 3 There has been a definite reluctance
to interfere with administrative decisions unless clearly arbitrary or be-
yond the scope of the regulatory power.-4 The mere fact that, accord-
ing to the board's judgment, the contemplated business venture did not
have much chance of success has been held sufficient cause to warrant
a stop order against the sale of securities.25  This judicial attitude of
tolerance was well expressed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota when
it said: 20
"In view of the ingenuity of those who seek to induce men and women to put
their money into far-off speculative enterprises over which the investor has
little or no control, and in view of the paternalistic character of Blue Sky Laws,
it should be the policy of the courts to refrain from hampering the State offi-
cials in the performance of their duties by placing a narrow construction on
such laws."
Again, where state utility commissions are granted control of utility
securities, -2 1 the courts have been loath to disturb commission findings
22. Note 21, supra. See also Wis. Laws 1933, c. 158, § 189.14.
23. Cf. Investment Reserve Corp. v. Michigan Securities Commission, 238 Mich. 606,
214 N. W. 311 (1927) (refusal to disturb commission order "unless the evidence is over-
whelmingly convincing to the contrary"); Pacific Home Building Realty Co. v. Daugherty,
75 Cal. App. 623, 243 Pac. 473 (1925) (Commissioner utterly free from any check or inter-
ference by means of writ of review. "If he reaches an incorrect conclusion on that
matter, it is obvious to us that his determination is merely error.").
24. See G. F. Redmond and Co. v. Michigan Securities Commission, 222 Mich. 1, 192
N. W. 688 (1923); Co-operative Farm Loan Co. v. Hirning, 40 S. D. 448, 167 N. W.
1055 (1918); cases cited note 23, supra. See Gross and Brown, Administrative Powers
Under Blue Sky Laws (1931) 16 ST. Louis L. Rsv. 141; Robertsoh, Administrative Con-
trol over Security Issues in Nebraska (1932) 11 Nm. L. BusL. 116; Note (1932) 12 B. U.
L. REv. 563.
The authority of commissions to impose conditions is upheld in Basalt Rock Co. v.
Macmillan, 80 Cal. App. 147, 251 Pac. 322 (1926); Leach v. Daugherty, 73 Cal. App. 83,
238 Pac. 160 (1925).
25. State ex rel. Hardstore Brick Co. v. Department of Commerce, 174 Minn. 200, 219
N. W. 81 (1928); Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158, 232 Pac. 140
(1924); Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929); Dominiguez
Land Corp. v. Daugherty, 196. Cal. 453, 238 Pac. 697 (1925); Home Lumber Co. v. State
Charter Board, 107 Kan. 153, 190 Pac. 601 (1920).
26. Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 195, 213 N. W. 904, 905 (1927).
27. Twenty-five states permit some kind of regulation of security issues by their public
service commissions. See Waltersdorf, State Control of Utility Capitalization (1927) 37
YALE L. J. 337; Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Issuance of Securities by Public Service Corpora-
tions (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 716, 906; Rosenbaum, Regulation of Security Issues by ihe Ohio
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and regulations.2 8  This fact is especially significant in the light of the
extensive control exerted by the courts and the correspondingly restricted
discretion allowed to the same commissions in questions of rate regu-
lation. 9 And in the Federal field, the somewhat limited jurisdiction of
the Postmaster-General over the sale of fraudulent securities through
the mails has on review been liberally treated by the courts.30
In direct contrast to these lines of precedent setting a liberal standard
for the judicial review of administrative security regulation, stands the
record of the federal courts in reviewing Federal Trade Commission
orders in the past. The paternal supervision exercised over the Com-
mission in its regulation of unfair trade practices has been too often noted
to need substantiation here. 1 Purporting to hold the Commission with-
in its statutory powers, the courts have in effect substituted their own
judgments at will for those of the Commission's experts, to the point of
Public Utilities Commission (1930) 4 CiN. L. Rav. 321; Comment (1933) 7 TETPLE L.
Q. 353.
28. Cf. Pollitz v. Public Utilities Commission, 97 Ohio St. 191, 119 N. E. 507 (1918);
Interstate Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 84 N.
J. L. 184, 86 Atl. 363 (1913); Hillsdale Light and Fuel Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities
Commission, 220 Mich. 101, 189 N. W. 893 (1922); Public Service Commission v. City
of Indianapolis, 193 Ind. 37, 137 N. E. 705 (1922); Fall River Gas Works Co. v. Board
of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners, 214 Mass. 529, 102 N. E. 475 (1913); United
States and Mexican Trust Co. v. Deleware Western Construction Co., 112 S. W. 447 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908). But the commission cannot by its exercise of discretion control the
activities of business enterprise. See Kansas City Kaw Valley and Western Ry. Co. v.
Bristow, 101 Kan. 557, 562, 167 Pac. 1138, 1140 (1917); People ex rel. The Delaware
and Hudson Co. v. Stevens, 197 N. Y. 1, 10, 90 N. E. 60, 63 (1909).
29. See MOSHER AND CRAwroRD, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1933) 52.
30. See 26 STAT. 466 (1890), 39 U. S. C. §§ 259, 732 (1926). The Postmaster may
issue "stop orders" forbidding the delivery of mail or money orders in connection with
"any scheme or device for obtaining money or property of any kind, through the mails, by
means of false or fraudulent pretences, representations or promises." That this applies to
fraudulent investment schemes see Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 497 (1904);
People's United States Bank v. Gilson, 161 Fed. 286 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); 23 Op. ATT'Y GEN.
512 (1901). The Postmaster General has been allowed a broad exercise of discretion under
this "stop order" power. In Appleby v. Cluss, 160 Fed. 984, 985 (C. C. D. N. J. (1908),
the court said: "A federal court will not weigh the facts adduced before the Postmaster
General in order to determine whether the court's judgment on the facts will accord with
his. It will only look into those facts for the purpose of determining whether, in any
aspect of the case, they are covered by any act of Congress or support a conclusion of
fraud." Cf. also Bates and Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904); Leach v. Carlisle,
258 U. S. 138 (1922).
31. See, e.g., McFARLAND, JtmxcLs. CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COIJIMSSION AND
THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 1920-1930 (1933); HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE CoAussioN (1924) 98 et seq. Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of
the Federal Trade Commission (1927) 4 Wis. L. REv. 257; Comment (1930) 4 TULANE L.
REV. 638; International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 U. S. 291 (1930).
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emasculating the administrative body in the performance of what it rea-
sonably conceived to be its proper duties."
It is true that this paternalism relaxed a bit as trade regulation left
its formative stage. The courts came to give more weight to Commis-
sion findings,33 perhaps from a feeling that their ward had grown older.
But through the technique of the earlier decisions, the courts still hold
and too readily exercise 34 a whiphand over the Commission. The dan-
ger is a live one that this same technique and this same unwillingness
to concede responsibility to the Commission may be carried over to the
securities field, particularly in view of the novelty of federal control.
Nor would it be difficult for the courts to discover legalistic justification
for hamstringing the Commission in its effective use of the stop order.
The legislative hope that the Commission's findings of fact "shall be
conclusive," 15 almost identical to that embodied in the Clayton Act,
3 6
could be qualified out of existence. At the utmost extreme, an application
of the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson 3"
-that "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts demand a court deter-
mination-might be held to subject to judicial review de novo every
Commission finding contributing to the issuance of a stop order, and
might thus leave the Commission without a vestige of discretion, power,
or usefulness under the Act.
Yet when the cases actually come to court, neither the liberal nor the
strict line of precedent will or should be controlling. The regulation of
securities by the Federal Trade Commission is an entirely different thing
from the regulation of securities by other commissions and from the
regulation of other matters by the Trade Commission. With the doors
of analogous precedent open to either choice, a display of tolerance and
a granting of leeway to the body entrusted with the major task of enforc-
ing an important piece of social legislation seems, without question, the
wiser judicial course.
In encouraging the courts to refrain from interfering with the admin-
istrative work of security regulation and to assist, by upholding, a prac-
tical enforcement of the Act, a large share of the opportunity and
32. Cf. Comment (1930) 4 Tu.LANz L. Rv. 638.
33. Cf. Hill Bros. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) ; Moir
v. Federal Trade Commission, 12 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926); Arkansas Wholesale
Grocers' Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
34. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, holding
that under the Clayton Act the courts must have the power to examine the whole record,
ascertain the issues presented, and determine whether there are any material facts not re-
ported by the Commission, since the statute grants jurisdiction to make and enter upon
the pleadings, testimony and proceedings, a decree affirming, modifying, or setting aside
an order.
35. § 9 (a).
36. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1926).
37. 285 U. S. 22 (1932); see Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037.
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responsibility reverts to the Commission itself. The more ably it super-
vises the issuing of securities, the less excuse the courts will find to over-
turn its decisions. So from the Commission's initial task of carrying
on its shoulders the affirmative protection of the investing public under
the Act, the circle returns again to the Commission, leaving to it the
correlative burden of persuading the courts not to interfere with a job
well done.
This importance of the Commission in the protective scheme will
become more and more apparent as time goes on. Such amendments
to the present statute as have been suggested or contemplated would not
narrow the broad scope of the Commission's power. Most of them seek
to limit or define more closely the liabilities imposed by way of back-
hand protection,3" and it is the furore raised in behalf of these which
has created in the public mind a warped impression of just what the
Act purposes to do. Among the more thoughtful and less prejudiced
proposals is one which would give the Commission original jurisdiction
of civil liability suits arising under the Act and thus complete the Com-
mission's cycle of direct responsibility. 9 After the changes have been
made and the courts have read law into the disputed phrases-after the
adolescent years have passed-the flexible day-to-day control of security
issues will still rest, curiis volentibus, with the Commission alone.
The Federal Securities Act was passed to protect individuals from
losing their money by investing it in unsoundly or unscrupulously fi-
nanced business enterprises. If this be truism, may the Commission,
the courts, and the commentators make the most of it.
39. See Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. 3. 171,
215.
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